Two series of separate negotiations-one public, one secret-focused on ending the Vietnam War. The public sessions were attended by representatives of four parties: (1) the United States, (2) North Vietnam, (3) South Vietnam, and (4) the National Front for the Liberation of the South (or Vietcong). 2 These sessions convened for the first time in January 1969. 3 The signing of the Paris Peace Accords was one of the few productive sessions of these public peace talks; the previous 174 plenary meetings yielded virtually no results. 4 In parallel with these public talks, secret negotiations commenced in Paris, starting in February 1970. U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho served as the dominant negotiators. 5 These secret negotiations ultimately produced the substantive breakthroughs that led to the Paris Peace Accords. (See Table 1 for a schematic of the public and secret talks.)
In 1965, Hanoi rejected Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai's request that North Vietnam dissociate itself from Moscow, and accepted some $550 million-worth of Soviet military assistance. 23 In 1965, reassured of continued Soviet and Chinese support, Ho Chi Minh launched the offensive against the South Vietnamese city of Pleiku, which marked the beginning of the U.S. war in Vietnam by triggering the U.S. "Rolling Thunder" bombing campaign, arguably authorized by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 24 The first U.S. combat troops were also deployed to Vietnam that year. 25 A wave of public anti-war protests greeted the bombing campaign and escalation of the U.S. military role. 26 Frustrated by his inability to bring the conflict to an end and facing a huge domestic backlash against the war President Johnson announced in March 1968 that he would not seek reelection.
Nixon and Kissinger. Richard Nixon was elected President in 1968 in the widespread expectation that he would end the deeply unpopular war in which almost 550,000 Americans were serving and 35,000 had already died. 27 On December 20, 1968 , the United States expressed readiness to seek a settlement. 28 The North Vietnamese responded with an ultimatum: all U.S. forces were to leave Vietnam, after the United States forcibly deposed the South Vietnamese government. 29 As President Nixon's National Security Adviser, Kissinger judged that, if fulfilled, Hanoi's demand to turn on an ally would deal a severe blow to the U.S. credibility worldwide.
In tandem with these opening negotiation moves, Nixon approved Operation Menu-a bombing campaign against North Vietnamese sanctuaries and supply lines in neighboring Cambodia from which Hanoi's attacks were weekly inflicting hundreds of casualties on American soldiers. 30 Starting on March 18, 1969, B-52s bombed within several miles of Cambodian border. 31 Kissinger maintained that this bombing took place in in largely unpopulated areas. 32 Lasting until May 26, 1970, these and similar measures undertaken later were deeply controversial at the time and have remained so for decades. All the criticisms of the Cambodian operations were magnified by the secrecy with which they were allegedly surrounded; Kissinger maintains that appropriate parties were properly informed throughout. 33 At home, Kissinger confronted potent anti-war forces. Numerous public and Congressional critics demanded prompt disengagement from Vietnam in return for the release of the American prisoners of war. On October 15 of that year, massive demonstrations took place around the country-20,000 in New York, 30,000 in New Haven, and 100,000 in Boston. 34 In 1971 and 1972, Congress passed, respectively, 72 and 35 non-binding resolutions demanding U.S. withdrawal. 35 Responding to the potent domestic backlash against the war, the Nixon Administration initiated regular troop withdrawals, hoping to keep the public united enough not to actively undercut the military efforts in Vietnam. President Nixon made the first decision to withdraw 25,000 troops on June 7, 1969, followed by 40,500 troops on September 16, 1969 , 50,000 on December 15, 1969, and 150,000 on April 20, 1970. More withdrawals followed: 70,000 troops on January 13, 1972 and 12,000 on August 29, 1972, which left 27,000 American soldiers in Vietnam. 36 Kissinger was convinced that Hanoi would seek to take battlefield advantage of the troop cuts that continually reduced U.S. military presence in Vietnam. He stated: "An enemy determined on protracted struggle could only be brought to compromise by being confronted by insuperable obstacles on the ground." 37 The North Vietnamese would draw out the negotiations while seeking a military victory. 38 In Nixon and Kissinger's judgment, the only way to keep up the military pressure on Hanoi, while satisfying the domestic demands for troop withdrawal, was to replace the departing troops with air and naval forces that were not included in the total troop numbers. 39 Kissinger negotiated for the first time with Le Duc Tho during three secret Paris meetings from February 20 to April 4, 1970. During the last of these sessions, Kissinger proposed a mutual U.S.-North Vietnamese withdrawal from South Vietnam within sixteen months. 40 On September 7, 1970, he went much farther than the April proposal: unlike the previous proposal, the U.S. was now prepared to leave no residual U.S. presence in South Vietnam. 41 Hanoi was unmoved, continuing to insist on U.S. complicity in effecting regime change in Saigon. 42 President Nixon's speech to the nation on October 7, 1970 positioned the United States as forthcoming and persistently seeking a negotiated settlement (at the public negotiating sessions, while, for the time being, keeping secret the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks), while accusing Hanoi as obstructing peace. 43 The President offered a cease-fire, including a halt to ongoing bombing, and a negotiation to agree on the timing and mode of U.S. withdrawal. The North Vietnamese quickly turned down the proposal. 44 The United States now took much more extensive steps to cut off the Vietcong insurgency's supply lines and sanctuaries in neighboring Cambodia and Laos. Hanoi had been using these routes and locations since the late 1950s to supply the Vietcong guerillas and to attack and kill thousands of South Vietnamese and American troops. 45 The United States invaded North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia in May 1970 and those in Laos in February and March 1971.
Kissinger regarded the ground invasions of Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries as strategically necessary to starve the Vietcong insurgency of support and to stop the attacks on American and South Vietnamese soldiers. U.S. anti-war critics, by contrast, condemned these actions as an unprovoked expansion of the war into neutral countries with dire long-term consequences for the region. Such critiques, often virulent, continue to the present day. 46 They further argue that the Cambodian invasion was militarily pointless and counterproductive by provoking the North Vietnamese into further aggression within Cambodia, undermining the Cambodian government, and eventually resulting in the brutal rule by the Khmer Rouge. 47 A corollary of this view is that Nixon and Kissinger purposefully misrepresented the efficacy of their Cambodia policy, keeping much of it secret. 48 By contrast, Kissinger believed a key front in the Vietnam War was Cambodia in which the North Vietnamese had been massively involved for years. One of the aims of the Cambodia operation was to signal to the North Vietnamese and its superpower supporters in Moscow and Beijing that the U.S. had the will and capacity to resist Hanoi's aggression by cutting off supplies to the Vietcong guerillas. 49 " We needed a strategy that made continuation of the war seem less attractive to Hanoi than a settlement," Kissinger reflected. 50 Kissinger likewise argues that the North Vietnamese expanded their Cambodian operation on their own irrespective of America's actions. 51 While previous offers envisioned a mutual U.S.-North Vietnamese withdrawal from South Vietnam, on May 31, 1971, Kissinger told Le Duc Tho that the United States was prepared to withdraw unilaterally in return for an end to North Vietnamese infiltration of Cambodia and Laos, which meant leaving the existing Vietcong and regular North Vietnamese formations in the South intact. 52 Again, Hanoi summarily rejected the offer.
Kissinger soon offered another concession. While in previous meetings he demanded that American prisoners be released before U.S. withdrawal, on August 16 he offered to withdraw U.S. troops at the same time as the prisoners were released as long as this did not involve the United States removing Saigon's government on the way out. 53 Hanoi rejected the offer.
Foreseeing a major North Vietnamese offensive against the South, Nixon and Kissinger sought to prepare the diplomatic ground for a powerful U.S. military response that they felt was necessary. 54 To accomplish this, Nixon needed to establish a record of reasonableness in negotiations. In his January 25, 1972 address to the nation, the President for the first time revealed the secret talks between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. After indicting Hanoi for rejecting the extremely forthcoming American peace proposals, Nixon offered to withdraw U.S. troops within six months. 55 However, he once again refused to overthrow the government in Saigon. 56 Kissinger shared the text of Nixon's January 25 speech with Moscow and Beijing, warning that the U.S. patience with North Vietnam was running low. 57 As expected, Hanoi launched a major offensive against the South on March 30, 1972. Nixon and Kissinger decided to respond forcefully, by mining North Vietnam's Haiphong harbor, thus starving Hanoi of Soviet supplies, and by undertaking a massive bombing of the roads and rail lines from China, which would be the preferred alternative route for supplies. 58 Beyond direct military action with U.S. and South Vietnamese troops to counter the North Vietnamese offensive, Nixon and Kissinger sought new sources of pressure on Hanoi. Given that both Communist giants provided extensive diplomatic and military support for North Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger sought to reduce or eliminate it. To do so, they consciously linked the U.S. policy in Vietnam to the developing détente with Moscow and the nascent rapprochement with Beijing.
Seeking Chinese Assistance on Vietnam. Soon after coming into office, President Nixon and Kissinger acted on a historic opportunity to explore positive relations with Beijing, hoping to overcome the mutual hostility of the preceding years. 59 They capitalized on the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship, which had continued to sour since the mid-1960s with the Soviets increasing troop numbers from 12 to 40 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border. 60 In August 1969, indications appeared that the Soviets were considering bombing China's early-stage nuclear facilities. 61 A U.S. message to Moscow in early September 1969 warning against attacking China was a key early part of the effort to dispel Mao's original fear that the U.S. would cooperate with the USSR against China. 62 Yet, Kissinger needed to confirm that, at a minimum, China's close links to North Vietnam would not preclude a U.S.-Chinese rapprochement. As the relationship developed, Kissinger increasingly made clear to his Chinese interlocutors that U.S.-Chinese strategic cooperation was partially linked to China's assistance in reining in its North Vietnamese client-a point that was not lost on the Chinese. During the first meeting between Zhou Enlai and Kissinger, Zhou remarked about North Vietnam: "we still feel a deep and full sympathy for them." Kissinger noted afterwards: "Sympathy, of course, was not the same as political or military support; it was a delicate way to convey that China would not become involved militarily or press us diplomatically." 63 Kissinger judged better U.S.-Chinese relations to be intrinsically worthwhile. Yet a U.S. rapprochement with Beijing could also induce the Soviets to moderate their foreign policy behavior, especially their support of North Vietnam, in order to avoid provoking a closer Sino-U.S. collaboration against Moscow. Ideally, a U.S. move toward China would provide enough incentives to the Chinese to be cooperative (e.g., moderate their material support for North Vietnam, help to diplomatically isolate Hanoi), but not so much as to allow them to take the U.S. cooperation for granted. Since the U.S. attitude included both the prospect of improving relations and a possibility of reverting to the status quo, it tended to institutionalize the strategic dependence of the Chinese. 64 In practice, American diplomacy with China had three distinct effects on efforts to negotiate a settlement to the Vietnam conflict. First, unlike the Korean War, in which Chinese troops became directly involved in battles with American forces, China gave tacit (and true) assurances to Kissinger that its forces would not become similarly involved. Second, to an extent that is still debated, China softened its support for Hanoi and helped to isolate North Vietnam diplomatically. 65 Third, the threat of a developing U.S.-China axis led the Soviets to moderate their support for Hanoi.
Seeking Soviet Cooperation on Vietnam.
Building on the developing rapprochement with China, Kissinger sought to persuade the Soviets to sharply reduce their diplomatic and military support for North Vietnam by threatening Moscow with abandoning détente and risking its potential benefits. 66 During the Johnson Administration, Kissinger assessed, the Soviets had not cooperated in helping to end the war because they had not borne meaningful costs for their support of North Vietnam. 67 Kissinger calculated that détente had already built up the Soviet "stake" in its bilateral relationship with the United States (which, Kissinger recognized, Moscow cultivated in part to counterbalance the burgeoning U.S. relationship with China) and that improvement thus far had whetted Moscow's appetite for further progress. 68 But how might this Soviet appetite be useful both with respect to arms control (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or SALT) and Vietnam? Kissinger saw a further potential source of U.S. leverage in its ability to offer (or block) progress toward resolving the long-simmering dispute between the Soviets and the western Allies over the status of Germany. This dispute had hampered Soviet efforts to expand valuable trade and diplomatic efforts with Europe. 69 This was the case since, after World War II, the four Allied powers-the United States, Soviet Union, France, and Britain-maintained military control over Germany. As a democratic West German state emerged alongside a pro-communist, Soviet-backed East German state, tensions had mounted between the two with the status of Berlin as its focus. 70 The three non-Soviet powers retained military control over West Berlin while the Soviets had walled off East Berlin. West Berliners were not recognized as citizens of the Bonn-based Federal Republic of Germany ("West Germany") . 71 Throughout the 1960s, with Berlin surrounded by East German territory and supported by vulnerable supply lines from the West, the West Germans and Allies refused to settle significant territorial disputes and wartime claims with the Soviets. Without a settlement, the Soviets' ability to trade, especially with West Europeans, was severely restricted.
In 1969, West German Prime Minister Willy Brandt began a concerted effort ("Ostkpolitik")-largely independent of Washington-to break the impasse with the Soviets. Brandt proposed a series of treaties to reduce tensions by opening trade agreements, resolving disputed territorial claims, and clarifying military arrangements. Brandt's initiative was largely motivated by his goal of keeping the dream of a unified German state alive (through engendering Soviet flexibility on this issue).57 Brandt's Ostkpolitik would earn him the Nobel Peace Prize, but Washington was deeply concerned that this policy might lead toward a neutral-possibly nationalist-Germany. Now Kissinger realized that it could be time to carefully soften American reservations about Ostpolitik (which the Soviets eagerly sought) in order to gain potential U.S. leverage on arms control and Vietnam.
A tangible opportunity for such leverage flowed from the so-called "Eastern Treaties," which would enable Moscow to relax its tensions with West Germany and, more broadly, in Europe. 72 Under the Eastern Treaties championed by Brandt-notably, the 1970 Treaty of Moscow between West Germany and the USSR-the signatories would normalize relations and renounce the use of military force. West Germany and the USSR signed the Moscow on August 12, 1970, though Germany still had to ratify it for the treaty to come into force. Given Brandt's somewhat shaky political situation, Moscow sought the U.S. help in pressing Bonn for prompt ratification (which Kissinger linked to a deal on Berlin). 73 Privately, Kissinger doubted that the U.S. could effectively intervene in West Germany's domestic politics. Publicly, however, he took advantage of Moscow's assumption that the American support was crucial to achieve German ratification.
During a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, Kissinger accused Moscow of "complicity" in Hanoi's March 1972 offensive against South Vietnam, and stated explicitly that the Soviet support for North Vietnam now posed grave difficulties for Washington to cooperate with Moscow on the Eastern treaties. 74 Lest the Soviets fail to get the seriousness of this message, Kissinger communicated the same point to Egon Bahr, Brandt's adviser, with the expectation that Bahr would pass the message to the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn. 75 Nixon's public revelations about American negotiating flexibility and major concessions in the Paris talks contrasted with North Vietnamese intransigence. At one point, Kissinger told Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that, "the Soviets had put themselves into the position where a miserable little country [North Vietnam] could jeopardize everything that had been negotiated for years." 76 Georgy Arbatov, a Soviet expert on American politics, advised five General Secretaries of the Soviet Union. "Kissinger thinks it was China that played the decisive role in getting us to feel the need to preserve our relationship with the U.S.A." Arbatov reflected, "But Berlin actually played a much bigger role, almost a decisive one. Having the East German situation settled was most important to us, and we did not want to jeopardize that." 77 Kissinger used the impending May 1972 Soviet-American presidential summit in Moscow-which would include the signing of the SALT agreement-as another forcing point. During a pre-summit meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, he pointedly complained about the continued stalling tactics by the North Vietnamese and ended with a stern warning: "If this process is maintained we will act unilaterally at whatever risk to whatever relationship." 78 Kissinger knew, however, that Moscow was unlikely to exert decisive pressure on Hanoi. 79 At the same time, he explicitly articulated a major American concession to the Soviet leader that mirrored what he had been quietly signaling to Le Duc Tho: the United States would not demand a complete withdrawal of the regular North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam in return for the North Vietnamese relinquishing their demand to forcibly remove Thieu from power. 80 On May 9, Nixon announced the U.S. response to North Vietnam's March 1972 offensive against the South: the mining of the Haiphong harbor and the bombing of the transportation links from China. Along with these powerful military actions, he offered to withdraw all troops within four months. 81 In a tacit but clear concession of immense significance both to North Vietnam and Moscow, the President did not demand that the North Vietnamese regular forces withdraw as a condition for the end of bombing and mining. 82 Renewed domestic protests greeted Nixon's decision. 83 Copyright 2016 © James K. Sebenius
On the diplomatic front, major progress ensued. The Moscow summit took place, SALT Treaty was signed, and the USSR assumed a more restrained public posture vis-à-vis Hanoi. Privately, the Soviets did not meaningfully object to the American military actions while exerting a degree of pressure on Hanoi to be more forthcoming in negotiations. 84 Persuading South Vietnamese President Thieu to Agree. Expecting a breakthrough in the negotiations, Kissinger kept in contact with President Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon. 85 87 Kissinger and his associates were privately jubilant at what finally appeared as the breakthrough they had sought. 88 Almost immediately, persuading President Thieu-using both threats and assurances-to accept the negotiated outcome became Kissinger's top priority. The threats-delivered orally and in writingcentered on the possibility of the complete cut-off of American aid in case Saigon refused to go along with the negotiated framework. 89 Along with the threats, Kissinger frequently communicated Nixon's assurances, which revolved around the President's stated determination to stand by its ally in Saigon in responding to the massive violations of the agreement by the North Vietnamese. 90 Nixon embodied the credibility of these promises and threats. Reelected in a massive 1972 landslide against the anti-war candidate George McGovern, he enjoyed a significant popular mandate. 91 "Our thinking," Kissinger remembered, "was that the agreement could be preserved unless the North Vietnamese launched another all-out offensive, in which case we believed that a combination of American air power and existing South Vietnamese ground forces could repeat the experience of '72 [the successful American and South Vietnamese military response to the March 30, 1972 North Vietnamese offensive]." 92 From early October until mid-November 1972, Thieu artfully postponed his acceptance of the agreement, requesting a number of changes. 93 It was becoming increasingly clear to Kissinger that Saigon was interested not in a negotiated compromise, but in a total U.S. victory over Hanoi. 94 Nonetheless, Kissinger negotiated with Le Duc Tho from November 20 to 25 and from December 4 to 13 in order to achieve the changes Thieu sought. 95 Le Duc Tho dragged out the negotiations without any substantive results. 96 To force Hanoi's hand and help persuade Thieu of American resolve to settle the war, Kissinger and Nixon decided on a short, but powerful military response: on December 17, the United States again mined the Haiphong Harbor, and bombed North Vietnam from December 18 to 29. 97 On the same day that this so-called "Christmas bombing" began, Washington proposed renewed negotiations. Kissinger met Tho on January 8 who, on January 9, agreed to sign the agreement, which was largely unchanged from the pre-Christmas version. 98 From January 14 to 21, there were final efforts to persuade a deeply reluctant Thieu to sign the accord, which he did and that came into effect on January 27, 1973. 99 The Aftermath. Hanoi proceeded to "immediately and grossly" violate the Paris Peace Accords, continuing the infiltration and attacks against South Vietnam. 100 Kissinger reflected years later: "had Nixon stayed in office, we would surely have attacked their [ Kissinger originally proposed this two-fold plan of attack in a memorandum dated September 11, 1969. At the time, he reflected that he sought to "make the most sweeping and generous proposal of which we were capable, short of overthrowing an allied government but ensuring a free political contest. If it were refused, we would halt troop withdrawals and quarantine North Vietnam by mining its ports and perhaps bombing its rail links to China. The goal would be a rapid negotiated compromise." See, White House Years, p. 284. Kissinger's logic is worth considering in full: "I have always believed that the optimum moment for negotiations is when things appear to be going well. To yield to pressures is to invite them; to acquire the reputation for short staying power is to give the other side a powerful incentive for protracting negotiations. When a concession is made voluntarily it provides the greatest incentive for reciprocity. It also provides the best guarantee for staying power. In the negotiations that I conducted I always tried to determine the most reasonable outcome and then get there rapidly in one or two moves. This was derided as a strategy of 'preemptive concession' by those who like to make their moves in driblets and at the last moment. But I consider that strategy useful primarily for placating bureaucracies and salving consciences. It impresses novices as a demonstration of toughness. Usually it proves to be selfdefeating; shaving the salami encourages the other side to hold on to see what the next concession is likely to be, never sure that one has really reached the rock-bottom position. 61 China exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1964.
In the following passages, Kissinger reflects on the barriers to a negotiated agreement between the two Vietnams, and the cultural differences that prevented the United States from promptly grasping the seriousness of these obstacles: "Our constant search for some compromise formula illuminated the cultural gap between us and the Vietnamese because the very concept of compromise was alien to both Vietnamese parties.
We had no way of understanding the primeval hatred that animated the two sides. They had fought each other for a generation. They had assassinated each other's officials, tortured each other's prisoners. The chasm of distrust and mutually inflicted suffering was unbridgeable by goodwill or the sort of compromise formulas toward which Americans incline. Each Vietnamese party saw in a settlement the starting point of a new struggle sometime in the not too distant future. Every deliberately vague formula I put forward was tested by each side to determine to what extent it represented an opportunity to inflict a humiliation on the despised opponent. And both sides were marvelously subtle and ingenious in changing phraseology to score such victories, particularly in the Vietnamese language with its finely shaded meanings quite beyond our grasp." See, White House Years, p. 1325. Likewise, Kissinger observed succinctly elsewhere, the North Vietnamese "had not fought for forty years to achieve a compromise." See, White House Years, p. 259, 1367.
95 White House Years, pp. 1416 -1422, 1428 -1443. 96 "I had come to Paris on December 4 with instructions from Nixon to settle. Le Duc Tho had kept me there ten days, our longest negotiating session ever, and each day we seemed farther away from an agreement. … Each day several issues that we thought had been settled in the agreement emerged again in loaded North Vietnamese drafts of either the understandings
